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Breaking the Cycle of Gridlock  
Thomas Hale and David Held 
 
There are increasing signs that the liberal international order created after 1945 risks 
collapse. While populism and nationalism are on the rise across the world, we are also more 
connected than ever before. Because these connections create not only gains and 
opportunities, but also losses and risks, they require careful management. And yet we are not 
rising to this challenge. A series of global collective action problems, from the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction to climate change, threaten to render our societies weaker, 
poorer, and more violent. There is a substantial risk that humankind may not end the twenty-
first century as well as it began it. 
 How these existential challenges are governed, and why their governance has been so 
inadequate, has preoccupied us for many years. In Gridlock: Why Multilateralism Is Failing 
When We Need It Most, published with Kevin Young in 2013, we sought to understand and 
explain the achievements and the limits of the postwar order. We concluded that deep 
structural trends, rooted in the extraordinary success of international cooperation and the 
transformations it allowed, now undermine its continued effectiveness and responsiveness. 
We set out a bleak picture of how gridlock paralyses multilateral governance, with dangerous 
implications. 
 This grim picture has stayed with us, and in some cases darkened further. However, it 
does not capture significant exceptions to the gridlock argument. Over the last three years we, 
in collaboration with eleven analysts of world politics,1 have explored and examined these 
anomalies, and tried to understand the balance between the pressures of gridlock, on the one 
side, and pressures for change, on the other. The resulting project, Beyond Gridlock (Hale, 
Held, et al. 2017), aims to understand these trends in order to inform strategies that can begin 
to break the cycle of gridlock. Drawing from this work, this article sets out seven pathways 
through and beyond gridlock, explains their significance, and highlights relevant evidence to 
support the main arguments. We begin by setting out why gridlock remains so central to any 
analysis of global governance, noting how it can perpetuate itself through the corrosive effect 
of unmanaged globalization on domestic politics. This sobering context makes the pathways 
                                                     
1 Garrett Wallace Brown, Michael Clarke, Camila Villard Duran, Ann Florini,  Lucas Kello, 
Andreas Klasen, Kyle McNally, James Orbinski, Tom Pegram, Taylor St John, and Kevin 
Young.  
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‘through’ and ‘beyond’ gridlock all the more remarkable. As the pathways are elaborated and 
applied to contemporary counter-trends to gridlock, a picture of global governance emerges 
that is more resilient, adaptive, and innovative than the original gridlock argument 
countenanced.  
 
Self-Reinforcing Gridlock and the Rise of Nationalism 
One of the central concepts developed in Gridlock was “self-reinforcing 
interdependence” (Hale, Held and Young 2013), the mutually enabling relationship between 
globalization and the institutionalization of world politics that profoundly deepened 
interdependence over the postwar period. The idea is that international cooperation is not just 
a response states use to manage existing interdependence; over time, cooperation also 
increases the links between economic and social systems across borders, deepening 
interdependence further. For example, trade agreements create incentives for companies to 
develop global supply chains and invest in technologies that facilitate cross-border 
production, changing their business models and building new constituencies for trade. The 
resulting increase in interdependence creates additional political incentives for countries to 
cooperate further, beginning the cycle again. We argued in Gridlock that this historical 
process of partially endogenous interdependence deepened to such a degree over the postwar 
period that a number of “second order” cooperation problems arose – namely, multipolarity, 
harder problems, institutional inertia, and fragmentation – causing gridlock. 
 Today it seems clear that gridlock itself also has a self-reinforcing element, one that 
emerges from the corrosive effect of unmanaged globalization on domestic politics. The rise 
of nationalism and populism across the world, in many different kinds of countries, has 
multiple and complex origins. But this trend can be seen as part of a downward spiral in 
which gridlock leads to unmanaged globalization or unmet global challenges, which in turn 
help to provoke anti-global backlashes that further undermine the operative capacity of global 
governance institutions (figure 1). 
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Figure 1: The vicious cycle of self-reinforcing Gridlock 
 
 
 Consider each dynamic in turn. First, as per the gridlock argument, we face a 
multilateral system that is less and less able to manage global challenges, even as growing 
interdependence increases our need for such management. Second, in many areas this 
inability to manage globalization or to meet global challenges has led to real, and in many 
cases severe, harm to major sectors of the global population, often creating complex and 
disruptive knock-on effects. Perhaps the most spectacular recent example of harm caused by 
mismanaged interdependence was the 2008–9 financial crisis. A product of inadequate 
regulation in major economies and at the global level, the crisis wrought havoc on the world 
economy in general, and on many countries in particular, which was reinforced in many 
places by severe austerity measures that tried to limit the fallout. We should not be surprised 
that such significant impacts have led to further destabilization. 
 Third, what has become clear only several years after the crisis is not just the 
economic cost, but the scale of the political destruction to which the crisis contributed. Rising 
economic inequality, a long-term trend in many economies, has been made more salient by 
the crisis. It reinforced a stark political cleavage between those who have benefited from the 
globalization, digitization, and automation of the economy, and those who feel left behind in 
the wake of these powerful disruptions. The global financial crisis was not the only cause of 
many of the political disruptions that have come to characterize and realign politics in major 
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countries in the last few years, but it has been a critical contributing factor in several of them, 
building on the economic dislocations that globalization had effected over several decades 
(Colgan and Keohane  2017). Perhaps most importantly, the financial crisis sharpened the 
divide between working-class voters in industrialized countries, who were hit hard by the 
events, and other segments of the population. This division is particularly acute in spatial 
terms, in the cleavage between global cities and their hinterlands. Global cities like London, 
Paris, Shanghai, New York, and San Francisco have become nodes of power and influence in 
the global economy, linked to each other through a variety of social and economic networks. 
Their citizens have benefited directly as opportunities have sharply risen. By contrast, those 
in the hinterlands, typically rural areas and deindustrialized cities, but not exclusively so, 
have often been left behind in absolute and relative terms, building up frustrations and 
resentments. 
 The effect on politics has been profound, with a number of nationalist and populist 
movements emerging and, in some cases, winning elections (or otherwise seizing power) in 
many countries. Again, we should not be surprised that people exposed to the negative effects 
of globalization will turn against it. Research shows that over the course of history, right-
wing populist movements and financial crises are strongly correlated (see Funke, Schularick 
and Trebesch 2016). Relatedly, the 2008 crisis exacerbated many of the woes that have beset 
the eurozone since 2010, such as the repeated bailouts of Greece and other countries, and 
consumed European politics, driving voters on both the creditor and debtor side of the 
political chasm towards Euro-scepticism. And more broadly, the impact on the centre-left 
parties that have traditionally supported global and regional cooperation has also been severe, 
with the differential effects of globalization straining the traditional coalition between 
metropolitan progressives and the working class. 
 The financial crisis is only one area where gridlock has undercut the management of 
global challenges and undermined political support for global cooperation. Consider the 
global response to terrorism. International cooperation, though effective in many areas, has 
failed to prevent extremists from attacking civilians around the world. While relatively 
cohesive and centralized networks like Al Qaeda have been largely taken apart through a 
combination of aggressive policing, surveillance, drone attacks, and other techniques, more 
inchoate movements like the Islamic State are much harder to root out. The attacks by these 
groups, for example in Paris in 2015, have been all too effective in creating a public discourse 
in many countries that sees perpetual war between Islamists and the West. This sentiment, in 
turn, creates political pressure for militarized responses from the West that can create as 
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many terrorists as they eliminate, as well as anti-Muslim policies that breed further 
resentment. 
 These negative effects also spill across issue areas. The failure to manage terrorism 
and to bring to an end the wars in the Middle East has had a particularly destructive impact 
on the global governance of migration. With millions of refugees fleeing their countries in 
search of safety and a better life for their families, many of them heading for Europe, the 
global forced migration regime has been overwhelmed. Many recipient countries have seen a 
potent political backlash from right-wing national groups and disgruntled populations, which 
further reduces the ability of countries to generate effective solutions at the regional and 
global level. 
 We see trends toward nationalism and populism across many different kinds of 
countries, from Trump’s United States to Duterte’s Philippines, from Putin’s Russia to Brexit 
Britain, from Modi’s India to Erdoğan’s Turkey. The anti-global backlash is heterogeneous 
and rife with contradictions. It encompasses terrorism in the name of Islam and Islamophobic 
discrimination against Muslims. It includes leftist rejection of trade agreements and right-
wing rejection of environmental agreements. One powerful tie that unites these disparate 
movements is a rejection of interdependence and collective efforts to govern it. Global 
institutions and (perceived) cosmopolitan elites have always been a potent and politically 
expedient whipping boy for nationalist and populists, even when those institutions, or some 
other form of international cooperation, are needed to tame the socio-economic forces that 
inflamed populist movements to begin with. This undermining of global cooperation, whether 
for migration, terrorism, financial regulation, climate change, or other areas, is the fourth and 
final element of self-reinforcing gridlock. As the global trend to nationalism and populism 
undermines the effectiveness of global institutions even further, the whole cycle begins anew. 
 In short, the destructive power of unmanaged interdependence has been unleashed by, 
in no small part, deepening gridlock in critical areas of global governance. It is important to 
note that such dynamics have long been familiar to many countries in the global South, which 
have always felt the sharpest edges of globalization and interdependence in the form of 
“structural adjustment” measures from international financial institutions, military 
interventions, and other intrusive forms of global governance. For many years, the developed 
countries’ wealth and political power insulated them from the worst elements of 
globalization, while their welfare states softened global capitalism enough to make it 
politically palatable for comfortable majorities of the population. This compromise of 
“embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982) – in which social democracy gave populations the 
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protection they needed to liberalize their economies – a cornerstone of the postwar order, 
now seems increasingly inadequate and threadbare.   
 
Moving ‘through’ and ‘beyond’ Gridlock  
 Given this self-reinforcing dynamic, gridlock is arguably even more structurally 
embedded in global politics than we argued in Gridlock in 2013. But at the same time it is 
possible to detect and analyse a number of significant counter-trends to these powerful 
developments. The central argument of Beyond Gridlock is that these systematic exceptions 
and qualifications to the logic of gridlock allow for strategies that provide concrete pathways 
out of gridlock. Some of them are even direct reactions to, or adaptations in response to, 
gridlock. Gridlock may be widespread and structural, but it is not omnipresent or 
determinative. Understanding these pathways and reinforcing them over time can allow 
actors to build more workable forms of global governance going forward, even under adverse 
conditions.  
 Before describing them, it is important to be more specific about what is meant by 
moving ‘through’ and ‘beyond’ gridlock. These terms refer to positions along a continuum of 
change in the outcomes of interest. “Through” connotes incremental yet significant 
improvements. “Beyond,” in turn, refers to a more fundamental transformation. While we 
expect moves through gridlock to be, on average, shorter in term than moves beyond 
gridlock, we do not assume a single temporal relation between the two. Various incremental 
steps may cascade into more profound transformations; alternatively, critical junctures or 
“punctuated equilibria” may provoke large realignments with great speed. 
 The issue we seek to address is: how can global governance become more robust and 
effective vis-à-vis the transborder policy challenges it seeks to address? Analytically, it is 
useful to separate this object of analysis into two sets of outcomes. First, we are concerned 
with the institutions and processes of global governance. Can we see the possibility of more 
cooperation and compliance and new, or newly effective, institutions, or simply further crisis 
and stagnation? Here we are particularly interested in explaining the creation, use, and 
effectiveness of transborder institutions and the patterns of state and non-state behaviour that 
play out around them. Can institutions emerge that provide collective benefits? Are rules 
created that stand a reasonable chance of shaping behaviour? Can existing institutions be 
reformed to become more efficacious? 
 Second, we are concerned with the impact of global governance on human welfare. 
Can and does more cooperation lead to better outcomes? If new or stronger 
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intergovernmental or transnational institutions emerge, do they have a significant and positive 
impact on the problems they seek to address? Or is their impact negligible? In relation to this 
second set of outcomes, it is of course essential to ask for whom the impact of global 
governance is positive or negative. In the abstract, we may wish to define effectiveness in 
general terms of public good provision. Can global governance arrangements in a given issue 
area meet the functional needs created by interdependence or not? For many issues, of course, 
the impact of global governance creates both winners and losers. Shifts in global governance 
may both help to resolve the functional dilemmas of interdependence while also 
disadvantaging or privileging specific actors or groups. Teasing out these differentiated 
impacts is crucial. 
 In what follows, then, we understand pathways through and/or beyond gridlock as 
causal processes that (a) improve the institutions and processes of global governance and/or 
(b) improve the impact of global governance on human welfare broadly, with particular 
attention to the range of potential positive and negative impacts that may apply to different 
groups. 
 To address these issues satisfactorily requires of course a meaningful counterfactual. 
Does the process or impact of global governance improve compared to what? Because there 
is no single appropriate counterfactual, in Beyond Gridlock we evaluate the outcomes of 
interest against several different benchmarks, triangulating among them as appropriate. While 
reasonable readers may disagree with the specification of some of the counterfactuals 
employed in the arguments below, we seek to make our evaluations as transparent as possible 
by being explicit about our assumptions and points of comparison. It seems to us that such an 
approach is unavoidable. Implicitly or explicitly, all evaluations of current effectiveness or 
prospects for future effectiveness entail some counterfactual analysis; the point is to be clear 
about it. 
 
Pathways through and beyond Gridlock 
 Pathways of change describe a constellation of conditions and causal mechanisms that 
apply across various domains. The pathways emphasize general factors like the preferences 
of states and other actors, the material and ideational processes that generate these 
preferences, the strategies actors employ, the institutional arrangements in which they 
operate, and power relations between them. Because we are interested in exploring tangible 
ways to advance effective global governance, the pathways emphasize relatively proximate 
and immediate dynamics, as opposed to more remote, structural, and long-term trends.  
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 In thinking about what these pathways might be we drew on the expertise of 
outstanding academics and policy experts working in a diverse range of problem areas in 
global politics. We brought this group together twice: once in Durham in 2015 and once in 
Oxford in 2016. These were far-ranging and intense discussions in which expertise on 
specific topics came into dialogue with arguments concerning cross-cutting global trends. 
This process laid the foundations for the research on which this article is based, and generated 
an account of seven distinct pathways of change. Each pathway is described below and 
summarized in table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1  Pathways through and beyond gridlock and their mechanisms 
Pathways Mechanisms 
1. Shifts in major powers’ core 
interests 
 Gridlock can provoke or exacerbate systemic or 
regional crises creating incentives for major 
powers to provide global public goods 
2. Autonomous and adaptive 
international institutions 
 The accrual of authority in some international 
institutions has made them increasingly 
autonomous from the interests of their members 
 Some international organizations possess 
generative rule-making capacity to adapt to new 
circumstances 
3. Technical groups with effective 
and legitimate processes 
 Issue areas in which states delegate to experts are 
relatively insulated from gridlock trends 
 Transparent and rational procedures add 
legitimacy to technocratic decision-making 
4. Multiple, diverse organizations 
and institutions coalesce around 
common goals/norms. 
 Possible for “additive” or “expansionary” 
contexts, not “absolute” issue areas 
 Diffusion and entrenchment of common 
principles, norms, and goals across a policy 
domain 
5. Mobilization of domestic 
constituencies for cooperation and 
compliance 
 Socializing communities of actors in particular 
practices and norms 
 Institutional channels give leverage to domestic 
and regional actors 
6. Civil society coalitions with 
reformist states 
 Coalitions across state–civil society boundaries 
generate new political possibilities 
 Does not challenge core interests of key states 
7. Innovative leadership as a 
reaction to gridlock 
 Gridlock provokes innovative and entrepreneurial 
strategies (e.g. norm entrepreneurship). 
 
1.  Shifts in major powers’ core interests 
 It is a core tenet of international relations theory that when one or more great powers 
have a strong national interest in policies that create a global public good, they will be willing 
and often able to provide that public good. Hard versions of Realist theory see this condition 
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as the only setting in which global public goods are likely to be provided, and it has been 
advanced as a prominent explanation for the postwar global order (Gilpin 1981). A central 
argument of Gridlock was that this mechanism has been decreasingly common in more recent 
decades, as growing multipolarity (1) increases the number of great powers that are required 
to act to provide a global public good in many issues domains; (2) increases the heterogeneity 
of interests among the great powers because states with very different political and economic 
systems weigh more heavily on world politics. Both of these effects make it less likely for a 
major power or a sufficient coalition of major powers to come together to provide a public 
good.  
 But while gridlock has reduced the conditions under which major powers will be able 
to provide global public goods as a positive externality of their national interests, it still 
remains possible, of course. Moreover, it may be the case that gridlock, by reducing the 
efficacy of multilateralism, generates exactly the kinds of crises that are most likely to bring 
together great powers in specific instances, despite long-term, structural trends to the 
contrary. For issues where (a) a great power (or sufficient coalition of powers) has a strong 
interest in solving a problem and (b) no other great powers are opposed, we might expect 
action to overcome gridlock. Such occasions typically arise only in the face of 
incontrovertible security threats when the relevant powers can gain much more from 
cooperation than from conflict. Such dynamics can be seen in the (fragile) P5+1 coalition 
(Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) that negotiated a 
nuclear settlement with Iran, in transgovernmental networks like the Financial Action Task 
Force (focused on money laundering, especially when connected to terrorist networks), in 
efforts to counter piracy around the Horn of Africa, in the launching of a concerted effort to 
tackle Ebola in West Africa, and in other security-oriented fields. But while major powers are 
able to jolt global governance through gridlock when they develop an interest in doing so, 
these interventions tend to be too narrow, ad hoc, and reversible to constitute a path truly 
beyond gridlock.  
 In climate and health, for example, action by major powers has provided an important 
pathway through previous gridlock, but does not yet qualify as transformational. In health, 
there has been a vast increase in funding from the G-7 for critical diseases, but not yet a full-
fledged effort to build robust health systems around the world to make diverse populations 
more resilient (Brown and Held 2017). In climate, shifting interests in the United States and 
China allowed the regime to evolve with the adoption of the Paris Agreement (Hale 2017). 
But such shifts cannot be taken for granted. The election of Donald Trump in the United 
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States provides a vivid example of how major powers’ priorities can suddenly shift against 
more effective cooperation. This reversibility highlights a key limitation of this pathway. 
There is no guarantee that major powers’ interests will shift in a way that counterbalances 
gridlock. Indeed, given global trends towards nationalism, the opposite may be more likely in 
the foreseeable future. So while shifts in major powers may lead to occasional breakthroughs 
in specific areas, the mechanism in general is unlikely on its own to provide a long-term 
pathway beyond gridlock. 
 
2.  Autonomous and adaptive international institutions 
 Gridlock argued that the past 70 years of international institution-building has had a 
profound effect on world politics, with many positive outcomes, but also a number of second-
order cooperation problems (e.g. institutional inertia and fragmentation) that result from a 
denser institutional landscape. While it is of course well recognized that under some 
conditions international institutions have become formidable autonomous actors in world 
politics (Barnett and Finnemore 2005), on average, we might expect gridlock to reduce the 
ability of international institutions to act proactively in world politics, as they become 
stymied by diverging member state interests, challenged by alternative fora under growing 
fragmentation, or find that new and more complex problems exceed their mandates and 
functional resources. 
 But there may also be systematic ways in which international organizations remain 
more autonomous and adaptive than these trends suggest, or even gain authority as 
multilateralism gridlocks. First, some international institutions have not seen their mandates 
or capabilities reduced under gridlock. The International Energy Agency (IEA), for example, 
possesses significant autonomy to decide on fuel reserve requirements, and its restrictive 
membership (only involving countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)) has ensured that it has not been hamstrung by contestation across 
member states (Florini 2017). More generally, while an organization’s autonomy is not 
independent of the underlying problem structure or interests of states (which had to decide to 
set it up that way in the first place), we expect many cases in which institutional inertia 
actually provides some benefits by counterbalancing multipolarity. Institutions, created under 
conditions of relatively less gridlock, can retain at least some of their autonomy even under 
conditions of increasing gridlock. Even in areas with sharp distributional implications or high 
sovereignty costs, some institutions have proven sufficiently autonomous and adaptive to 
chart a course through gridlock. For example, though the WTO’s negotiation function has 
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stalled, the other elements of the global trade regime, including standard-setting, technical 
cooperation, and dispute resolution, have endured. 
 Moreover, some international institutions have been given unique capacities to adapt 
to emerging issues and shifting constellations of power and interests. This ability may be 
particularly strong for legal institutions, which possess a “generative” function: the ability to 
decide new rules for situations not originally envisioned by states. For example, the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) has been increasingly called upon to adjudicate cases 
for which WTO members have established no clear sets of rules. Many of these controversial 
cases have even involved member states, such as China, that joined the WTO significantly 
after the treaty-making process had occurred, and which we might therefore expect to 
challenge existing rules. Despite these difficult circumstances, the WTO adjudicators have 
developed a careful, politically informed jurisprudence that has been able to resolve disputes 
over a number of issues beyond what the WTO’s creators originally envisioned, and has 
ensured a relatively high rate of compliance with these decisions. Ironically, gridlock in trade 
negotiations between countries may have strengthened the DSM’s autonomy by forcing it to 
fill some of the rule-making gaps countries have left unfilled. 
 One of the interesting features of this pathway is the ability of such institutions to 
reassert their centrality in an increasingly plural institutional landscape. A reinvigorated 
WTO may be able to strengthen its coordination of the welter of preferential trade agreements 
that have developed in recent years and therefore bring greater coherence to global trade rules 
(Klasen 2017). Similarly, the IMF is looking to play a coordinating role in managing the 
proliferation of currency swap arrangements between central banks (Duran 2017). Such 
interactions suggest that the relatively strong international institutions that exist today can 
become focal points around which more comprehensive and effective global governance 
arrangements may accrete, merging with other pathways explored below. In this way 
autonomous and adaptive international institutions can maintain and even expand existing 
patterns of cooperation even under difficult conditions. 
 
3.  Technical groups with effective and legitimate processes 
 A related, but conceptually distinct pathway emphasizes the ability of technical 
groups to work effectively in a “low politics” context. It has long been recognized that 
cooperation is easier for more technical issues that avoid excessive interest conflicts or 
matters of “high politics” (Held 2004). Even when distributional problems exist, the low 
salience and complexity of such issues buffer them from conflictive politics. For these 
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reasons, we expect gridlock to apply significantly less in these areas. Like the autonomous 
and adaptive institutions discussed under pathway two, these entities are somewhat insulated 
from conflicts between member states. But unlike the other category, this insulation stems 
from the expertise-based nature of the issue, not necessarily an explicit delegation of 
authority by states or other power resources possessed by the institutions. To be sure, some 
institutions, such as international financial institutions, combine both autonomy and 
expertise. 
 But even purely technocratic institutions are vulnerable to the charge that they are 
unrepresentative, or privilege certain actors or others. The World Intellectual Property 
Organization, for example, has been subject to such challenges from developing countries. 
We therefore expect technocratic institutions to be especially insulated from the dangers of 
gridlock when they embody fair and transparent procedures that are likely to be seen as 
legitimate by a wide range of actors. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), for example, has managed to govern a potentially very contentious area 
of world politics, assigning domain names and protocols to govern the internet, an issue in 
which political and commercial actors have significant stakes. Yet these interests have not 
managed to upset the basic functioning of the institution, which has been able to provide an 
essential global public good. 
 Effective technical processes are often, unsurprisingly, “under the radar,” but this 
does not diminish their importance. For example, while state-to-state treaty negotiations over 
reducing trade barriers get the most attention in the trade realm, standard setting, commercial 
dispute resolution, and export finance cooperation are also critically important to the global 
economy. Global governance in these areas, dominated by technocratic groups, many of them 
combining state and non-state actors, seems to be working quite well (Klasen 2017). Similar 
effectiveness can be observed in scientific cooperation around climate change, or in the realm 
of nuclear safety (Clarke 2017; Hale 2017). The importance of this pathway suggests that, in 
many ways, we take significant areas of global governance for granted, even in the academic 
literature. Thus, the gridlock narrative is missing out on important swathes of cooperation 
that are robust even in the face of challenging structural trends. 
 But by the same logic, this pathway is better at preserving cooperation and finding 
incremental gains than in fundamentally transforming our capacity to manage 
interdependence. Technical groups rarely, if ever, overturn the fundamental barriers to 
effective global governance. This is to be expected. Significant change almost always 
requires, virtually by definition, political mobilization, coalition building, and contestation. 
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4.  Multiple, diverse organizations and institutions coalesce around common goals/norms 
 Gridlock focused on the negative effects of fragmentation in global governance, such 
as the increase in transaction costs that may result, or the way in which forum shopping can 
undermine incentives for cooperation. However, there may also be ways in which 
fragmentation can represent an adaptive and effective response to the challenges of 
cooperation under conditions of gridlock. In particular, a plurality of actors and institutions 
can be mobilized to generate resources, political coalitions, and institutional structures that 
could not emerge from traditional state-to-state multilateralism. Such “webcraft” strategies 
(Slaughter 2017) open new possibilities despite, or even driven by, gridlock.    
 This pathway may prove particularly fruitful when public goods provision is being 
held back by just a small group of spoilers and the good in question is not “absolute” but 
“additive” in nature. Additionally, a proliferation of diverse organizations and institutions 
may be particularly efficacious when common rules or principles give coherence to an 
otherwise fragmented institutional landscape. For example, transnational commercial 
arbitration represents a common set of practices and procedures for resolving disputes 
between commercial actors across borders. While it depends in part on international treaty 
law, the work of actually adjudicating disputes is carried out by hundreds of private legal 
organizations around the world specializing in commercial dispute resolution. The decisions 
of these bodies are then given force through domestic courts under both international and 
domestic law. Because common practices and rules guide this enormously diverse, pluralistic 
landscape, the regime functions in a strikingly consistent way across diverse countries and 
institutions (Hale 2015). It has also proven highly resilient, enduring across geopolitical 
shifts, including gridlock, that have undermined more formalized institutions. 
 Even in areas or world politics characterized by gridlock trends, progress can be 
observed when a proliferation of organizations and actors cohere around a common purpose. 
Such a structure is vigorously in evidence in the realms of health and climate and energy, for 
example, where private actors, multi-stakeholder initiatives, and networks of cities, 
businesses, NGOs, and other sub/non-state actors have reshaped the governance landscape. In 
climate it is estimated that the actions of cities, businesses, and other sub/non-state actors can 
reduce as much carbon from the atmosphere as the pledges of nation-states (UNEP 2016). 
Similarly, in global health, private funds and funding channelled through hybrid institutions 
now constitute the majority of money going towards the management and mitigation of 
critical diseases in the developing world (Brown and Held 2017). In other words, for both 
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these issues, nation-states and formal intergovernmental processes have been joined by a 
wide array of complementary actors and institutions, which have made a qualitative 
improvement in the global governance of these areas. 
 A critical characteristic of these domains is that the proliferation of organizations and 
actors work towards a common goal. In climate, the common objective of limiting 
temperature change to 2°C or 1.5°C this century, established by the UNFCCC, has been 
directly translated into the objectives of many cities, businesses, regions, and other actors 
(Hale 2017). In global health, the International Health Regulations and numerous WHO 
guidelines (e.g. regarding what drugs to use) give coherence to the wider range of efforts now 
being undertaken (Brown and Held 2017). In addition, in the domain of human rights, 
national and transnational networks of non-state actors have used the international human 
rights regime developed in the 1960s and 1970s as a lever to insert the human rights agenda 
into numerous national polities (Pegram 2017). This is not to say that such polycentric 
systems do not suffer from relatively high transaction costs for coordination and some degree 
of redundancy. But the existence of common norms and objectives helps make plurality a 
virtue in these contexts. 
 This pathway can also be observed, but with more limited success, in 
humanitarianism, and envisioned as a potential way forward in the realm of investment. In 
the former, the existence of a coordinating committee with an established division of labour 
for humanitarian actors provides an important degree of coherence, though practice in the 
field has lagged behind the decisions taken by the global bodies headquartered in Geneva 
(McNally and Orbinski 2017). For investment, the norms dominating the field are now in 
state of flux, and it is currently unclear if one will emerge to provide a focal point for 
different dispute resolution institutions to cohere around (St John 2017).  . 
 Of all the pathways, this merger of plurality and coherence seems to have the most 
transformative potential. In climate, health, and human rights, for example, the regimes have 
made enormous progress by tapping this broader array of actors. That said, the pathway also 
faces a critical scope condition: it only appears in areas where a wide range of actors possess 
the ability to make a positive contribution to the governance challenge in question. Because 
any number of actors and entities can affect climate, health or human rights, those issues are 
more amenable to a pluralistic strategy. This would not be the case for, say, nuclear security, 
tariff barriers or financial regulation, where the actors with the capacity to affect the problem 
are almost entirely nation-states. 
 
15 
 
5.  Mobilization of domestic constituencies for cooperation and compliance 
 Because growing multipolarity can increase the divergence of preferences within the 
minimal set of states required to achieve cooperation, Gridlock expects cooperation to stall. 
Other scholars have instead emphasized the way in which global governance may shift states’ 
interests in ways that promote cooperation over time, for example by “socializing” states in 
cooperative patterns or creating and reinforcing domestic interests groups that push for 
greater cooperation. This raises the possibility that states or other actors may make strategic 
interventions to mobilize certain constituencies in other states in order to increase the 
willingness of those states to cooperate or otherwise promote effective transborder 
governance. For example, various human rights institutions were created precisely to 
strengthen the role of pro-law, pro-rights bodies within domestic politics by elevating their 
voice to the international level. Likewise, international human rights norms can be used to 
mobilize significant political action by domestic actors, strengthening the hand of pro-
compliance groups in domestic societies, in a way that strengthens the global governance of 
human rights. (Pegram 2017). Alternatively, the large investments that rich, green 
jurisdictions have made in renewable energy have lowered the costs of those technologies, 
making climate policies more attractive to less rich, less green countries by reducing 
opposition from economic groups concerned about the price of energy (Hale and Urpelainen 
2015). The 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change is animated by a similar logic, 
deploying various instruments – the review process, technical support for countries 
implementing climate policies, orchestration of climate action by transnational networks of 
sub- and non-state actors – that aim to strengthen support for pro-climate policies in countries 
over time. 
 
6.  Civil society coalitions with reformist states 
 Some of the greatest successes in global governance in the 1990s came about from 
concerted civil society efforts. When activist groups have been able to partner with 
progressive countries, significant shifts have been possible, such as the Mine Ban Treaty, the 
creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
doctrine, the Guiding Principles for Internal Displacement, or the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control. Transnational business interests have also proved adept at organizing 
support for certain global governance initiatives in partnership with governmental allies. 
 Yet, today such potential can be identified only in two realms: investment (St John 
2017) and humanitarianism (McNally and Orbinski 2017). In the former, some developing 
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countries have been seeking to leave the investor–state dispute settlement system, while the 
EU has sought to create a public alternative to private arbitration. In the latter, many 
developed and developing countries have introduced significant improvements in the 
coordination and delivery of healthcare, both in emergency situations and in routine health 
service provision. In both cases, governments have been pushed by, and worked in tandem 
with, civil society activists. While it remains unclear whether and to what extent these 
changes will result in lasting transformations, the potential to do so seems strong 
 In contrast, in other areas, for example nuclear proliferation, human rights and 
financial regulation, we find little evidence at this time that civil society movements can 
fundamentally alter global gridlock. This finding is striking and discouraging because these 
areas have traditionally been targets for widespread activism, such as the peace and 
disarmament movements of the 1960s and 1970s, the struggle for human rights, most marked 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Occupy Wall Street movement that emerged after the 2008 
crisis. We are thus left with the somewhat bleak conclusion that one of the most reliable 
traditional pathways to effective political change, and one of the pathways with the greatest 
transformative potential, seems to have a fairly narrow window for application at the present. 
This may, of course, change in due course as politics in many countries becomes more 
contentious and new generations redevelop social movements. But to the extent this 
possibility exists, it remains in the future. Civil society groups and social movements will be 
most successful in agenda-setting and policy impact if (a) they work with states and (b) seek 
change that, while reformist, can be accommodated within existing structures and 
organizational principles, at least in the short to medium term.  
 
7. Innovative leadership as a reaction to gridlock 
 Gridlock and related arguments about the ineffectiveness of global governance 
typically rely on structural explanations, with shifts such as increasing multipolarity and 
complexity playing a key role. Emphasizing general patterns over idiosyncratic behaviours 
makes social scientific theories usefully parsimonious. But this exercise of course assumes 
that general patterns exist and explain a large amount of the phenomenon or outcomes of 
interest compared to more anecdotal accounts. It also tends to deemphasize the agency of 
individual actors and specific leaders.  
 But is it possible that the very fact of gridlock can itself increase the likelihood that 
individual actors will develop new forms of agency to overcome it? Faced with both an 
increasingly stymied international system, and with deepening interdependence and 
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challenges that affect their interests, individuals, states, and other actors may innovate and 
develop more sophisticated and effective strategies to meet the new challenges they face. In 
other words, it is possible that more difficult global challenges help generate innovative 
behaviours to overcome them. Even if such leadership remains the exception that proves the 
rule, it may be a significant dynamic in discrete areas of world politics, and offer hope and 
guidance to policymakers seeking proactive change in a gridlocked world. 
 Encouragingly, in several areas, states and other actors have responded positively and 
strategically to gridlock by exercising leadership of various kinds. In climate, for example, 
the way top UN officials and national diplomats shifted the regime from a “regulatory” to a 
“catalytic” model, by articulating a new vision of what multilateral institutions should do, 
helped unlock new political possibilities (Hale 2017). In health, the steep increase in funding 
for critical diseases by G7 countries and private entities like the Gates Foundation has made a 
crucial difference to the global disease burden (Brown and Held 2017). These kinds of 
constructive actions result from farsighted and public-spirited decisions taken by key 
individuals, some of them motivated by failures of global governance they could no longer 
abide. In this sense they represent “leadership” of the highest order. 
 
Conclusion  
 This article has argued that self-reinforcing gridlock and the rise of nationalism pose 
major threats to the liberal international order. Gridlock not only emerges from self-
reinforcing interdependence, in which globalization has deepened beyond the management 
capacity of the institutions that helped create it, but is also compounded by its pernicious 
impact on national politics. The result can be a schizophrenic crisis as we are caught between 
deepening interdependence and major global challenges that require sophisticated 
management, on the one hand, and populist and nationalist movements that seek to demolish 
or weaken our capacity to do so, on the other. Having said this, the article, drawing on the 
Beyond Gridlock project, focused on examining significant anomalies and counter-trends to 
these developments. Unpacking these systematically has revealed seven distinct pathways of 
change which provide the means and mechanisms to cut through or beyond gridlock. None of 
these pathways alone offer silver bullets. But they all highlight ways of moving through and 
beyond gridlock, even if the movements are small and incremental. One of the key lessons of 
this argument is that one size does not fit all. That is to say, there are several pathways to 
significant policy change, and it is necessary to grasp what works and why in different 
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sectors. Understanding how different issues and sectors are amenable to different pathways of 
change creates a capacity for practical strategies for working through and beyond gridlock.  
 The theory of gridlock and pathways through it helps us understand why the 
remarkable period of global cooperation which began with the founding of the UN, and 
deepened through subsequent decades of intensifying globalization, has now run into 
systematic difficulties, and how we might address these. The vicious circle of self-reinforcing 
gridlock compounds the problems and adds to the conditions that have spurred the rise of 
nationalism and anti-global backlash.  While this urge to retreat from the international and 
global makes sense when the impact of globalization is pervasive and gridlock prevents its 
effective management, the reassertion of national autonomy in a globalized world does not 
increase control, it weakens it. Simply tearing down global institutions would only exacerbate 
global problems that give rise to discontent in the first place. 
 Although it has been shown that most change is incremental, transformative change 
beyond gridlock does happen. Major leaps forward in the institutional structures of nations 
and the world order often follow major wars and calamities. But political wisdom requires 
that we learn to make significant and strategic changes before tragedies unfold, and not just 
with hindsight. After all, our ability to harm ourselves has increased; when weapons of mass 
destruction, global pandemics, and environmental collapse loom, reform-through-crisis 
becomes a very unattractive option. Looking back at the institutional world order set down 
after 1945, and the reasons for its successes and failures, it is clear that we have to understand 
and grasp these if we are to avoid the cycle of calamitous tragedies and institutional change. 
How we shift from the postwar institutional order to a new structure of “sustainable 
interdependence” is a major long-term question, but productive steps are available, here and 
now. Building and strengthening institutions, shifting preferences in major states, new 
transnational coalitions of civil society working in partnership with states, and other shifts are 
an important part of this story. And innovative leadership is a significant channel to build 
these pathways through and ultimately beyond gridlock. 
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